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The vision of the Grid is to support the dynamic establishment and subsequent 
management of virtual organizations (VO). To achieve this presents many 
challenges for the Grid community with perhaps the greatest one being 
security. Whilst Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) provide a form of single sign-
on through recognition of trusted certification authorities, they have numerous 
limitations. The Internet2 Shibboleth architecture and protocols provide an 
enabling technology overcoming some of the issues with PKIs however 
Shibboleth too suffers from various limitations that make its application for 
dynamic VO establishment and management difficult. In this paper we explore 
the limitations of PKIs and Shibboleth and present an infrastructure that 
incorporates single sign-on with advanced authorization of federated security 
infrastructures and yet is seamless and targeted to the needs of end users. We 
explore this infrastructure through an educational case study at the National e-
Science Centre (NeSC) at the University of Glasgow and Edinburgh.  
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The vision of the Grid [7] is to support the dynamic establishment and subsequent 
management of virtual organizations (VOs). The term dynamic is italicized here as it 
could be argued that this is what distinguishes Grid infrastructures from other large 
scale distributed systems. With no prior detailed agreements in place, it should be 
possible to create a VO which will allow collections of individuals and/or 
institutions to securely share resources whether these resources are data sets, data 
archives, computational resources, services or more specialized equipment. A key 
element of this vision is the notion of single sign-on where a single set of user 
security credentials are sufficient to allow access to a multitude of federated 
resources across the VO.  
Perhaps the greatest challenge in realizing this dynamic model is security. Sites 
wishing to potentially form a VO need to be aware of the consequences of 
establishing such collaborations. It is the case in computer security that the weakest 
link rule applies; this fact is magnified by Grid infrastructures due to their openness. 
Highly secure multi-million pound compute facilities can be compromised by 
inadequately secured remote laptops. Rigorous security procedures at one site can be 
made redundant through inadequate procedures at another collaborating site. This 
problem is exacerbated by the predominant Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [11] 
authentication-only based security models prevalent across most high performance 
computing related Grid infrastructures today, where establishment of user identity is 
the primary security focus (and not on restricting what the user is allowed to do on 
  
 
 
 
 
 
2                                           (PRO-VE) CONFERENCE ON VIRTUAL ENTERPRISES 
 
the given resource). With the move of the Grid community to more security focused 
areas such as the health domain, this authentication-only security model is 
unrealistic and does not lend itself to the adoption of Grid technology. Considerable 
progress has been made in developing advanced security infrastructures that are well 
integrated into Grid middleware [8,20]. However the challenge remains how to 
establish a VO in a dynamic manner where sets of fine grained distributed security 
authorization policies defining what end users are allowed to access/use on local 
institutional resources can be supported across multiple independent institutions. 
One common approach to solve this is through the establishment of federations 
which can be considered as groups of organizations which agree to adopt common 
policies and technical standards to provide a common infrastructure for managing 
access to resources and services in a uniform way. The Internet2 Shibboleth 
architecture and protocols [18,19] have been developed to support the establishment 
of federations where devolved authentication and security attribute release across 
multiple independent institutions is supported. Through Shibboleth, authentication at 
a home institution Identity Provider (IdP) by a user can in principle support single 
sign-on across a federated VO where security attributes and assertions are released 
which can subsequently be used by service providers (SP) to make authorization 
decisions. This model of single sign-on lends itself to advanced authorization in 
more security focused VOs, but requires detailed negotiation of security attributes to 
be defined a priori. This pre-agreed and potentially detailed negotiation and 
agreements goes somewhat against the true vision of the Grid where dynamic VOs 
can be established and managed “on-the-fly”, and where new agreements and 
policies can be added as new institutions, new resources and users are brought 
together for potentially short time periods. 
In this paper we outline a novel solution prototyped within the UK JISC 
Dynamic Virtual Organizations for e-Science Education (DyVOSE) project [5] that, 
using a basic institutional trust relationship between sites supports single-sign 
combined with advanced authorization of federated security infrastructures based 
upon delegation of authority. We explore this infrastructure in an educational setting 
through a programming assignment set as part of the Grid Computing module part 
of the advanced MSc at the University of Glasgow.  
 
2. EXISTING GRID SECURITY LIMITATIONS 
Grid security is still predominantly based around PKIs to support authentication, i.e. 
the validation of the identity of a given user requesting access to a given resource. 
The simplest PKI involves a single Certification Authority (CA) which is trusted by 
all users and resource providers. With this model, users only accept certificates 
(signed by the CA which associate the users private key with their public key) and 
certificate revocation lists issued by this CA. This model makes certificate path 
analysis easy since there is a single step from a certificate to the CA who issued it.  
Other more complex PKI architectures also exist. For example, users may keep a 
host of trusted CAs. However, issues such as how to tell trustworthy one from 
untrustworthy one arise. Hierarchical PKIs where there are chains of trust between 
the CA, sub-ordinate CAs and users may also exist. This model allows limiting the 
damage caused by compromised subordinate CAs. Thus if a subordinate CA is 
compromised then only the certificates issued by them (or their subordinate CAs) 
need to be revoked. Other more complex architectures exist again, such as meshes of 
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PKIs where trust relationships (webs of trust) are established on a peer-peer basis. 
This model often requires bridging solutions [12,15] between CAs and results in 
certificate paths that are harder to establish – potentially containing loops.  
The main benefit and reason for the widespread acceptance of PKIs within the 
Grid community is their support for single sign-on. Since all Grid sites in the UK 
trust the central CA at Rutherford Appleton Laboratories (RAL) [23], a user in 
possession of an X.509 certificate issued by this CA can send jobs to all sites, or 
rather to all sites where a user has requested and been granted access. Typically with 
Globus based solutions gatekeepers are used to ensure that signed Grid requests are 
valid, i.e. from known collaborators. This is manifest through the Distinguished 
Name (DN) of the requestor being in a locally managed access control list (ACL) 
grid mapfile which typically maps DNs to local user accounts. These ACLs are 
typically manually updated and managed based upon individual user requests. The 
dynamicity of this manual approach is not conducive to the Grid-idea for 
dynamically establishing new, potentially short term VOs. Instead users have to 
statically have their DNs registered at collaborating sites which have previously 
made available/allocated local accounts. Once the Grid scales to the wider research 
and academic communities (as opposed to the current focus on the “Grid” 
community) where many millions of users1 exist this centralized model of 
certification is likely to have scalability issues.  
The process of acquiring an X509 certificate itself is off-putting for many of the 
less-IT focused research community since it requires them to convert the certificate 
to appropriate formats understandable by Grid middleware, e.g. through running 
cryptic (in the confusing sense!) openssl commands [13]. This problem is further 
exacerbated since openssl is not commonly available on platforms such as Windows 
and requires separate software to be installed. Once in the appropriate Grid format, 
users are then obliged to remember necessarily strong 16-character passwords for 
their certificates with the recommendation to use upper and lower case alphanumeric 
characters. The temptation to write down such passwords is apparent and an 
immediate and obvious potential security weakness.  
The fundamental issue with PKIs for Grid security however, is trust. Sites trust 
their users, the CA and other sites. If the trust between any of these is broken, then 
the impact can be severe, especially since users are currently free to compile and run 
arbitrary code. With the now global PKI and associated recognition of international 
CAs through efforts such as the International Global Trust Federation 
(www.gridpma.com), this basic trust model is naïve. For this reason, Grids have 
been seen as at best something to be considered separately from existing compute 
infrastructures or at worst as a potential threat to those infrastructures.  
 
3. SINGLE SIGN ON AND ADVANCED GRID SECURITY FOR 
STATIC VOs 
Numerous technological solutions have been put forward looking towards providing 
various enhanced Grid security models and solutions such as CAS [14], GSI [9], 
PERMIS [2] and VOMS [1]. Examples of how these compare to one another is 
                                                           
1
 There are currently over 3 million Athens accounts across UK academia from over 2,000 
organizations. To put this into context there are approximately 3500 UK e-Science certificates 
issued by the UK e-Science CA that are currently valid across the UK.  
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described in [21]. Recent developments in Grid standardization [8] and associated 
implementations [3] have shown, however, how finer grained models of security can 
be achieved supporting authorization closely integrated with Grid solutions.  
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) based solutions represent one of the more 
scalable solutions for advanced authorization infrastructures [permis]. Such systems 
allow for definition of roles which are typically associated with given privileges on a 
system and as such, are less susceptible to change than individual user identities. 
The roles themselves are assigned to subjects (users) by issuing them with an X.509 
attribute certificate (AC) [2]. These roles and ACs can in turn be used to form the 
security policies for a given site. Systems such as PERMIS allow for the expression 
of digitally signed (and hence tamper proof) security policies based upon triplets 
comprised of <Role, Target, Action>. A local authority – the Source of Authority 
(SoA) will specify policies based upon institutional roles, institutional resources 
(targets) and actions that can be performed on those resources. Once defined, these 
policies can be used to ensure that only users with appropriate roles (privileges) can 
access certain services or data resources and perform certain actions. It has been 
shown [22] how such infrastructures can be defined and used as the basis for 
limiting access to Grid resources and data sets. Such systems predominantly work at 
the local authorization level, i.e. the policies apply to the local site only. With Grid 
based inter-institutional VOs this model of security is not the norm and collective 
understanding of inter-institutional security infrastructures is needed.   
Supporting multiple attribute authorities is something that the Internet2 
community has focused on explicitly in the Shibboleth architecture and protocols 
[18,19]. The UK academic community is currently in the process of deploying 
Shibboleth technologies (http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/) to support local (existing) 
methods of authentication for remote login to resources. Through this model, sites 
are expected to trust remote security infrastructures for example in establishing the 
identity of users (authentication) and their associated privileges (authorization). To 
support this, the Shibboleth architecture and associated protocols identify several 
key components that should be supported including federations, Identity Providers 
(aka origins), Service Providers (aka targets) and optionally Where Are You From 
(WAYF) services. Through these components, end users will have single usernames 
and passwords from their home institutions which will provide for seamless access 
to a range of resources at collaborating institutions and service providers. Local 
security policies at service provider sites can then be used to restrict (authorize) 
what resources authenticated users are allowed access to.  
To understand the impact of Shibboleth technologies on Grid security it is first 
necessary to have an appreciation of the interactions that typically arise with 
Shibboleth. When a user attempts to access a Shibboleth protected service or Service 
Provider (SP) more generally, they are typically redirected to a WAYF server that 
asks the user to pick their home Identity Provider (IdP) from a list of known and 
trusted sites. The service provider site has a pre-established trust relationship with 
each home site, and trusts the home site to authenticate its users properly.  
After the user has picked their home site, their browser is redirected to their 
site’s authentication server, e.g. an LDAP repository, and the user is invited to log 
in. After successful authentication, the home site redirects the user back to the SP 
and the message carries a digitally signed SAML [17] authentication assertion 
message from the home site, asserting that the user has been successfully 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  5 
 
authenticated (or not!) by a particular means. The actual authentication mechanism 
used is specific to the IdP. If the digital signature on the SAML authentication 
assertion is verified and the user has successfully authenticated themselves at their 
home site, then the SP has a trusted message providing it with a temporary 
pseudonym for the user (the handle), the location of the attribute authority at the IdP 
site and the service provider URL that the user was previously trying to access. The 
resource site then returns the handle to the IdP’s attribute authority in a SAML 
attribute query message and is returned a signed SAML attribute assertion message. 
The Shibboleth trust model is that the target site trusts the IdP to manage each user’s 
attributes correctly, in whatever way it wishes. So the returned SAML attribute 
assertion message, digitally signed by the origin, provides proof to the target that the 
authenticated user does have these attributes. We note that later versions of the 
Shibboleth specification have introduced a performance improvement over the 
earlier versions, by allowing the initial digitally signed SAML message to contain 
the user’s attributes as well as the authentication assertion. Thus the two stages of 
authentication and attribute retrieval can be combined. 
This security model offers several direct benefits over PKIs for dynamic 
establishment of VOs in that users are no longer trusted to manage their X509 
certificates and remember complex passwords. Instead institutions within a 
federation have a degree of trust with one another. Sites/IdPs and SPs are still 
autonomous and are able to decide for themselves whether the provided attributes 
are sufficient for access to the resources and which attributes they are prepared to 
release to which SP. Another key benefit of Shibboleth for VO establishment and 
management is that users are only required to remember their own usernames and 
passwords at their home institutions.  
Provided a common understanding of the roles and security attributes across the 
sites comprising the federation exists, single sign on can be achieved. Thus if a SP 
trusts a given site for authenticating a user requesting access to its own resource, and 
also an agreement on the attributes which are to be exchanged between the sites 
exists, then the SP can authorize/restrict access to its resources from those sites that 
are within the correct federation and that provide the necessary attributes and their 
values needed to give access to the resource. Within the UK a single federation is 
being proposed (www.sdss.ac.uk) and a small set of security attributes based upon a 
subset of the eduPerson specification is being adopted [16]. These attributes include 
eduPersonScopedAffiliation which indicates the user’s relationship (e.g., staff, 
student, etc.) within their home institution; eduPersonTargetedID which is needed 
when an SP is presented with an anonymous assertion only as provided by 
eduPersonScopedAffiliation; eduPersonTargetedID attribute which provides a 
persistent user pseudonym; eduPersonPrincipalName which is used where a 
persistent user identifier, consistent across different services is needed, and  
eduPersonEntitlement which enables an institution to assert that a user satisfies an 
additional set of specific conditions that apply for access to a particular resource. A 
user may possess different values of the eduPersonEntitlement attribute relevant to 
different resources.  
One key aspect of the UK federation which helps to support single sign-on 
across numerous resources is the facility to maintain session information. Thus in 
accessing their IdP, the user is able to specify whether the WAYF should remember 
them for the duration of the session, for a week or not at all. In accessing subsequent 
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Shibboleth protected services, the WAYF will automatically recognize which IdP 
the users are from and redirect them accordingly.  
Proof of concept systems demonstrating how Shibboleth based access to Grid 
resources has been achieved is described in [25]. However Shibboleth by its very 
nature is much more static than the true vision of the Grid, where VOs can be 
dynamically established linking disparate computational and data resources at run 
time. Instead Shibboleth requires agreed sets of attributes that have been negotiated 
between sites. What is needed instead is a more dynamic way in which security 
attributes associated with a VO can be established and accepted across a given 
federation.  
 
4. SINGLE SIGN-ON AND ADVANCED GRID SECURITY FOR 
DYNAMIC VOs 
The definition of detailed policies for access to and usage of multiple site resources 
will face scalability issues for large scale Grid infrastructures where many different 
users, services and resources exist. This is further compounded when new users join, 
leave, new resources are added and removed etc. Having a single SoA to manage a 
security infrastructure at a given site is not realistic for large scale, evolving Grid 
infrastructures. Ideally, it should be possible to delegate the privilege for others 
including potentially those at other trusted sites to issue ACs which will be 
recognized locally. This is especially the case when complex or short lived dynamic 
VOs are to be established and managed. To address this, the DyVOSE project has 
prototyped a delegation issuing service (DIS) [3] as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: DyVOSE Delegation Issuing Service 
The DIS is a web service that can issue ACs on behalf of a SoA. In a traditional PMI 
model a SoA that issues roles or privileges to users must have a PKI key pair. This 
restriction implies that the SoA is responsible for all privilege allocations within at 
its own site. Ideally a SoA, e.g. a systems-administrator, would like to be able to 
delegate the privilege to issue new roles to other trusted entities/people, e.g. to a 
local researcher wishing to establish a particular VO, or potentially to a remote but 
trusted entity. The DIS service itself does not require that delegated/trusted entities 
are required to hold a PKI key pair in order to issue ACs to their subordinates 
however the SoA will by definition restrict the roles that its subordinate authority 
will be able to issue. The DIS service also allows delegated entities to also delegate 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  7 
 
privileges to others. To minimize the potential security risks that might arise through 
this, subordinate authorities will always have lower privilege than their superiors.  
Through the delegation of authority capabilities offered by the DIS service, sites 
wishing to establish VOs dynamically are able to create attribute certificates 
associated with the particular demands of the give VO. Once defined, users wishing 
to access resources across multiple institutions are able to use the single sign-on 
capabilities of Shibboleth to authenticate themselves at their home site, and have 
these attributes (which have been dynamically created) to be used by SPs to make 
subsequent authorization decisions. Through this, dynamic VOs can be established 
where fine grained authorization policies are created based upon attributes specific 
to the security of the VO and created by privileged members of the VO. Subsequent 
access to Grid resources across the VO can, through Shibboleth, be based upon the 
appropriate attributes being defined and subsequently delivered for authorization 
decisions to be made to VO resources.  
To explore the capabilities of the DIS service for dynamic attribute creation and 
their usage for subsequent single sign-on through Shibboleth to access and use 
dynamically established VO resources, we have explored this technology within the 
advanced MSc Grid Computing module at the University of Glasgow.   
 
4.1 Case Study 
The Grid Computing module at the University of Glasgow required the advanced 
MSc students to undertake a large scale programming assignment. This assignment 
was focused on exploring latest developments in Grid middleware such as Globus 
and Condor [4], and exploring fine grained security infrastructures. Specifically, the 
students were required to implement a Globus-based bioinformatics application 
(BLAST) which was to run across a Condor pool. The application required them, in 
the first instance to develop a client to access a remote Grid service (BlastData) in 
Edinburgh University which was protected by the PERMIS authorization 
infrastructure and return the appropriate sequence data. This service and the 
associated security policy was developed and deployed in advance for the students. 
The students were split into two groups: groupA and groupB. These groupings 
(roles) were then used by the BlastData service and its security infrastructure to 
enforce/restrict access to the data accessible. The data itself was nucleotide or 
protein sequence data sets depending on the role (group) the students were in.  
Once the data was returned the students were expected to use this as input to 
their own Globus based BLAST service which would run across the Condor pool.  
This service was also PERMIS protected with the policy such that only members of 
their team could invoke the service, i.e. people with their role. Diagrammatically the 
assignment and associated infrastructure is given in Figure 2.  
In the infrastructure the Glasgow SoA used the Edinburgh DIS service to issue 
attributes within the Edinburgh PMI for roles needed across the VO, i.e. they were 
delegated the privilege by the Edinburgh SoA to create roles within the Edinburgh 
role hierarchy. Through creation of a VO specific role, e.g. externalStudent within 
the Edinburgh policy via DIS and mapping of the DNs of Glasgow students to this 
role, Glasgow students have subsequently been able to access and return the 
appropriate sequence data sets for input to the BLAST service. Through the 
hierarchy of the XML role policy at Edinburgh, any privileges that the external role 
holds will be inherited by the appropriate roles as deemed suitable by the local 
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Edinburgh SoA, e.g. an externalStudent may have less privilege than an 
EdinburghStudent role which already exists within the Edinburgh PMI. This 
hierarchical management of roles allows distinct levels of trust to be implemented 
based on a user's function and location within the VO without surrendering local 
policy integrity. Thus for example, Glasgow students are able to access Edinburgh 
Grid compute resources but not allowed to print on local printers. 
 
Figure 2: Grid Computing Assignment Utilizing Dynamic AC Creation and Authorization 
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
The dynamic establishment and subsequent management of VOs represents a 
significant security challenge to the Grid community (if it is done correctly!), but a 
challenge that needs to be overcome in order for Grid technology to be taken up by 
the more security focused communities such as the medical domain, or industry 
more generally. The dynamic delegation of authority infrastructure supported within 
the DyVOSE project offers one possibility through which advanced authorization 
infrastructures can be linked dynamically. Through delegated creation of VO 
specific roles and attributes, VOs can be established in a dynamic manner without 
compromising the overall security. At the time of writing the students at Glasgow 
are in the final phases of their implementation work with the successful return of 
sequence data already completed based upon dynamically created security attributes 
– thus proving the proof of concept in using DIS for dynamic VO establishment and 
fine grained authorization. 
To simplify the overall process in access to and usage of VO Grid resources, the 
Shibboleth technology offers direct benefits for single sign-on, but currently requires 
a more static view of the security attributes that are available. Through the DIS 
service, an SP may, subject to its having the appropriate privilege at IdPs be allowed 
to create attributes for those IdPs which will subsequently be needed for access to 
the resource. This model significantly changes the dynamics through which future 
VOs may be composed. Truly dynamic security oriented VOs where service 
providers not only offer services but the attributes needed for access to these 
services has hitherto not been addressed by the Grid community. This work is being 
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explored in a variety of security oriented projects at the National e-Science Centre 
especially in the e-Health domain. 
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